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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The Plaintiff, John F. Thornton ("Thornton"), the Appellant herein, brought this case 
seeking to quiet title to an easement and to a portion of real property jointly owned by the 
Defendants, Mary E. Pandrea ("Pandrea") and Kari A. Clark ("Clark"), who are sisters. 
Defendant Clark counterclaimed against Thornton for interference with her easement and for 
declaratory relief establishing her rights in and to the easement. Prior to entry of judgment in the 
underlying matter, Pandrea's and Clark's jointly-owned property was partitioned in kind by way 
of a separate district court matter. 
On Clark's Motion for Summary Judgment, the district court entered judgment in Clark's 
favor on all claims, except Clark's claim for damages, which was reserved for determination at 
trial. Prior to trial, Thornton and Clark stipulated to dismiss Clark's claim for damages. 
Thornton and Pandrea also stipulated to dismiss all of Thornton's claims against Defendant 
Pandrea with prejudice. Pandrea, having brought no cross-claims or counterclaims of her own, 
was then no longer a party to the action. After all claims were adjudicated, the district court 
awarded attorney fees against Thornton, and Rule 11 sanctions against Thornton and his 
attorney, Val Thornton, Intervenor herein. Thornton and his attorney, Intervenor Val Thornton 
("Intervenor"), appeal the judgment of the district court in favor of Clark. After entry of said 
judgment, the Barrets purchased Clark's property and substituted in the stead of Clark in the 
underlying action and in the instant appeal. 
B. Statement of Facts 
1. PARTIES TO THE CASE: The parties to this case are as follows: 
a. John Thornton ("Thornton"): the Plaintiff in the underlying action and 
the Appellant in the instant action; 
b. Val Thornton ("Intervenor"): Intervenor in the instant action, wife of 
John Thornton, attorney for John Thornton in the underlying action, and also the instant action; 
1 
c. Mary Pandrea {"Pandrea"): Defendant in the underlying action, sister of 
co-defendant Kari A. Clark, aunt of substituted Defendant Deanna Barrett; 
d. Kari A. Clark {"Clark"): Defendant and Counter-claimant in the 
underlying action, sister of co-defendant Mary Pandrea, aunt of substituted Defendant Deanna 
Barrett; 
e. Kenneth J. and Deanna L. Barrett, husband and wife (collectively 
"Barretts"): Defendants and prevailing counter claimants substituted in the stead of Clark in the 
underlying action, Respondents substituted in the stead of Clark in the instant appeal, niece 
(Deanna) of Clark and Pandrea. 
2. PROPERTIES AT ISSUE IN THE CASE 
Idaho Appellate Rule 35(g) provides that for cases involving real property and easement 
disputes that an illustrative drawing be provided depicting the layout of the parcels, easements 
and features. According to the rule, "[t]he parcels, pieces and features depicted shall be labeled 
so as to adequately identify them. The document shall be based upon testimony or evidence in 
the record with citations to such supporting evidence." Id. 
Thornton, in his Appellant's Brief, rather than using the recorded surveys of the 
properties for illustrative purposes, uses instead "maps" he has hand-drawn and which he has 
misleadingly altered from those found in the record to which he cites1. Since the recorded 
surveys, which are of record, accurately depict the properties and the subject easement at issue in 
this case, the Respondents cite to those surveys, and, for the Court's benefit, have reproduced 
them and appended them hereto as Exhibits A and B. 
1Thornton claims that "[t]wo of Thornton's maps [that Thornton presented to the district court] 
are appendixed to [his] brief." He asserts that his "Map One" is the same as his hand-drawn map 
found at R. Vol. II, p. 326 and that his "Map Two" is the same as his hand-drawn map found at 
R. Vol. II, p. 334. Appellant's Brief, p. 2, L. 2-8. A comparison of the maps contained in the 
record at the citations he has provided shows they are not the same. Thornton has altered 
the maps from those contained in the record. Significantly, he has removed from the ones 
appended to his brief a portion of the easement - the portion that shows that the easement 
extends completely across Parcel I until it reaches Parcel II. See the comparison of Thornton's 
maps on the following page. 
2 
MAP ONE 
. II, p. 326 (above), which Thornton claims i 
A comparison of Thornton' s maps found in the record to where he cites (R. Vol. II, 
p. 326 and p. 334) to his "Map One" and "Map Two" appended to his briefreveals 
that he has altered his Map One and Map Two in a number of respects from the 
maps in the record. His most notable (and misleading) alteration is his removal 
of the portion of the Clark Estates Easement, which shows that it extends from 
what he has designated as "Parcel C" (Parcel II) entirely across what he has 
designated as "Parcel B" (Parcel I). 
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R. Vol. II, p. 334 (above), which Thornton claims is the same as Map Two (above) 
The Respondents likewise find the Appellant's assigned designations of the properties at 
issue to be confusing and misleading. They are confusing because he refers to them by names 
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other than those used in the district court matter, and because the designations he has assigned 
to the parcels do not align with their commonly-known and recognizable designations as found 
in the relevant surveys of the properties. They are misleading because at the time when 
Thornton filed his Complaint, Clark and Pandrea jointly owned two parcels, commonly known 
as Parcels I and II, but prior to entry of judgment in the underlying case, those two parcels were 
partitioned into two newly-configured and independently-owned parcels, commonly known as 
the Pandrea Parcel and the Clark Parcel. Thornton fails to make this distinction. 
Now, in his Appellate Brief, Thornton reverts to his post-summary judgment designation 
of the properties as Parcel A (allegedly the Thornton parcel), Parcel B (allegedly the Pandrea 
Parcel/ Parcel I), and Parcel C (allegedly the Clark Parcel/Parcel II). "Parcel B" cannot, 
however, be both the Pandrea Parcel and Parcel I because the Pandrea Parcel is not the same as 
Parcel I. Likewise, "Parcel C" cannot be both the Clark Parcel and Parcel II because the Clark 
Parcel is not the same as Parcel II. The Pandrea Parcel and the Clark Parcel are both wholly new 
and independently-owned parcels created by the district court in the partition action, which 
divided the entirety of Clark's and Pandrea's jointly-owned 20+ acre property. The boundary 
lines of the new parcels do not coincide with the original two parcels that made up the jointly-
owned property. The whole is the same but the parts are not3• 
The 1979 Clark Survey (reproduced on page 8 below and appended to this brief as 
Exhibit A) designates the property that had been jointly-owned by Clark and Pandrea at the 
2 In the underlying district court matter, Thornton used various inconsistent designations for the 
Defendants' parcels, at times referring to them as "Tax Lot 40" and "Tax Lot 49" and at other 
times as Parcels B and C, as he does in the instant appeal. Thornton recognizes this 
inconsistency, stating in his Appellant's Brief"[t]hat parcel has been described in various 
pleadings of the parties as Pandrea's Parcel, Parcel I, Tax Lot 40, and Parcel A herein." 
Appellant's Brief, p. 13, L. 12-13. 
3 Previously the parts were essentially 'l-4 (Parcel I) plus % (Parcel II), but the Partition Judgment 
divided the whole as 9/20 (the Clark Parcel - 10.423 acres) plus 11/20 (the Pandrea Parcel -
12.739 acres). R. Vol. II, p. 440. 
4 
inception of the underlying case as Parcels I and II. The 2014 Partition Survey (reproduced on 
page 12 below and appended to this brief as Exhibit B) shows the parties' properties as they were 
configured when judgment was entered in the underlying case. The 2014 Partition Survey 
identifies the parcels by the names of the owners of the parcels as follows: Pandrea, Clark, and 
Thornton 4. For consistency and clarity, the Respondents will refer to the properties in this brief 
by the designations shown on the surveys of record as follows: Parcel I, Parcel II, Pandrea 
Parcel, Clark Parcel, and Thornton Parcel. 
THE DOMINANT ESTATE 
Parcels I and II: 
a. On August 14, 2013 when Thornton filed his Complaint, Pandrea 
and Clark jointly owned approximately 20 acres5 of land to the north of Thornton's property. 
The land they jointly owned consisted of two parcels: Parcel I and Parcel II of the Harry Clark 
Estates. R. Vol. I, pp. 128-129, 143. The parcels they jointly owned were parcels created by 
subdivision in 1979 from a larger parcel of land previously owned by their parents, Harry and 
Edith Clark. Prior to division, these parcels were part of the family farm where Pandrea and 
Clark spent their childhood years. R. Vol. I, p. 145. On July 3, 1979 the Survey of the Harry 
Clark Estates was recorded in Bonner County under Instrument No. 223082 ("1979 Clark 
Survey"). R. Vol. II, p. 440. The 1979 Clark Survey accurately depicts Parcels I and II, the 
county road (Pack River Road), and the easement that was created to provide Parcel II and Parcel 
4 The newly-created parcels are the Pandrea Parcel and the Clark Parcel. Thornton was not a 
party to the Partition Action and, thus, the Thornton Parcel was unchanged by the partition 
judgment. R. Vol. I, pp. 137-143. 
5 In a separate action in which Pandrea' s and Clark's jointly-owned property was partitioned, it 
was discovered after a survey of the property that it consisted of 23.162 acres, rather than only 
20 acres. Id. 
5 
IX6 access to the county road ("Clark Estates Easement"). The survey is reproduced on page 8 
below with color-coding for easy reference: Parcel I is green, Parcel II is yellow, the Clark 
Estates Easement is blue, and the county road is pink. A copy of the survey taken from the 
record is additionally included in the Appendix as Exhibit A. R. Vol. I, p. 143. 
l. Parcel I: On February 13, 1980, Pandrea purchased 
Parcel I from the Harry F. and Edith E. Clark Trust by way of Warranty Deed, recorded on May 
20, 1980 as Bonner County Instrument No. 226223 ("Parcel I Deed"). R. Vol. II, p. 373. As 
shown on the 1979 Clark Survey, Parcel I reached the county road and therefore did not require 
easement access. Parcel I was, however, created subject to the Clark Estates Easement. The 
legal description contained in the Parcel I Deed reads as follows: 
Subject to a 30.0 foot easement for a road right-of-way and utilities, more fully 
described as follows: A tract ofland for a road easement located in Section 11, 
Township 59 North, Range 2 West, Boise Meridian, Bonner County, Idaho, said 
road easement being 30.0 feet wide (15.0 feet each side of the centerline) the 
centerline being more fully described as follows: Commencing at the southeast 
comer of said Section 11,; thence N.0°58'55"E, along the east line of said section 
a distance of 1325.42 feet; thence west a distance of 1978.63 feet; thence N. 
27°57'08"W, a distance of 448.04 feet to the point of beginning; thence S. 
59°03'17"E, a distance of 637.22 feet; thence S. 58°03'22" E. a distance of 
300.0 feet more or less to the easterly right-of-way of the Pack River County 
Road. 
Id. (Emphasis added - bolded words highlight the start and end points of the easement.) 
This description matches up from the start and end point of the 30' ROAD EASEMENT 
shown on the 1979 Clark Survey that begins from the comer where Parcel I intersects with 
Parcels II and IX, traverses Parcel I, and extends to Pack River Road. 
6 Parcel IX is not owned by any of the parties to this action and was not impacted by the 
judgment in the underlying case as no claims were brought against the owner of that parcel. 
6 
On February 16, 1981, Pandrea quitclaimed an undivided half interest in Parcel I to her 
sister, Kari Clark. R. Vol. II, p. 375. 
ii. Parcel II: On August 29, 1991, Clark purchased Parcel 
II from the Harry F. and Edith E. Clark Trust by way of Warranty Deed, recorded on October 17, 
1991 in Bonner County under Instrument No. 396781 ("Parcel II Deed"). R. Vol. II, pp. 377-
378. As shown on the 1979 Clark Survey, Parcel II did not extend to the county road so access 
was provided by way of easement. The legal description of the easement in the Parcel II Deed 
was as follows: "TOGETHER WITH and subject to a 30.0 foot easement for a road right of way 
and utilities on existing road as surveyed or to be surveyed." Id. 
iii. On November 10, 1992, Kari Clark quitclaimed an 
undivided half interest in Parcel II to her sister, Mary Pandrea7• 
7 See Document 1 to Appellant's Motion to Augment filed with this Court on December 17, 2015 
("Appellant's Motion to Augment") -Affidavit of Val Thornton in Support of Plaintiffs 
Motion to Reconsider Summary Judgment filed May 6, 2014, Ex. 8. 
7 
-~ 
-
R. Vol. 11, p. 440 
8 
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Portion of survey showing the Clark 
Estates Easement Js snlarged In box. It 
shows that the easement (which Parcel I Js 
·subject to?. extends from the intersection 
of Parcels I, II, and IX across P8f'C61 I until 
reaching Paci< River Road. 
THE SERVIENT ESTATE 
"Thornton Parcel" 
b. On November 10, 1992, Pandrea and Clark conveyed a portion of 
their jointly-owned property to Pandrea and her then husband, Robert Wiltse ("Wiltse") by way 
of Quitclaim Deed recorded in Bonner County on December 1, 1992 as Instrument No. 416381 
("Wiltse Deed"). R. Vol. I, pp.128-129. In the Wiltse Deed, they conveyed to Wiltse and 
Pandrea a small portion of Parcel II (the "Well Piece") and the southerly strip of Parcel I (the 
"Shoreline Piece"). This conveyance resulted in cutting off Clark's and Pandrea's access to Pack 
River Road from their property, so they reserved as part of the Wiltse Deed the Clark Estates 
Easement to allow them continued access. The legal description of the easement that Parcel I 
was "subject to" in the Parcel I Deed remained the same (from the point where Parcels I, II, and 
IX intersected to the county road), but the description within the Wiltse Deed stated that the 
property conveyed to Pandrea and Wiltse was now "Subject to and reserving [the Clark Estates 
Easement]" for the benefit of Clark and Pandrea. Id. (Emphasis added.) 
On December 23, 1991, Clark, Pandrea, and Wiltse purchased the parcel adjoining the 
"Shoreline Piece" to its east by way of Warranty Deed recorded on December 30, 199las Bonner 
County Instrument No. 399727. R. Vol. II, pp. 380-382. This parcel, together with the Shoreline 
Piece, became the property commonly known and referred to in this action as the "Thornton 
Parcel." On October 13, 1992, Clark conveyed her interest in this piece to Pandrea and Wiltse 
by way of Quitclaim Deed recorded on October 20, 1992 as Bonner County Instrument No. 
414162. R. Vol. II, pp. 359, 384-385. Pandrea and Wiltse thereafter divorced, and Pandrea 
conveyed her interest in the Thornton Parcel to her ex-husband, Wiltse. 
On May 4, 1998, Wiltse conveyed the Thornton Parcel to John Thornton and his then 
wife, Teresa Thornton, by way of Warranty Deed recorded in Bonner County under Instrument 
9 
No. 525386 ("Thornton Deed").8 R. Vol. I, pp. 132-135. The Thornton Deed specifically and 
expressly described the Thornton Parcel as being "Subject to": 
EASEMENT AND CONDITIONS THEREOF RESERVED BY 
INSTRUMENT 
IN FAVOR OF: MARYE. PANDREA WILTSE, A MARRIED 
WOMAN DEALING IN HER SOLE AND SEPARATE PROPERTY; 
AND KARI A. CLARK, A SINGLE WOMAN 
FOR: A 30.0 FOOT EASEMENT FOR A ROAD 
RIGHT OF WAY AND UTILITIES 
RECORDED: DECEMBER 1, 1992 
INSTRUMENT NO.: 416381 
As pointed out in Section I(C)(2)(b) above (page 9), the easement description in the 
Wiltse Deed (Instrument No. 416381) referenced in the Thornton Deed began at the point where 
Parcels I, II and IX intersected, then crossed Parcel I, then continued across what is now the 
Thornton Parcel until reaching the county road. The easement description matches the easement 
shown on the 1979 Clark Survey. 
SEVERANCE OF DOMINANT PARCEL 
"Clark Parcel" and "Pandrea Parcel" 
c. At the time Thornton filed his Complaint, Clark's and Pandrea's 
jointly-owned Parcels I and II were the subject of another action wherein Pandrea and Clark had 
requested the Court partition their property ("Partition Action")9. On January 24, 2014, five 
months after Thornton filed his Complaint, judgment was entered in the Partition Action 
("Partition Judgment"). R. Vol. I, pp.13 7-143. In partitioning the property jointly owned by 
8 John Thornton and Teresa Thornton thereafter divorced and Teresa Thornton conveyed her 
interest in the Thornton Property to John Thornton. 
9 The Partition Action is Bonner County District Court Case No. CVl 1-835. That case was 
brought by Mary Pandrea on May 11, 2011, wherein she requested the Court to partition the 
approximately 20 acres of property-Parcel I and Parcel II of the Harry Clark Estates -that she 
and her sister, Kari Clark, jointly owned. 
10 
Pandrea and Clark, the district court did not partition it according the boundaries of the Harry 
Clark Estates' Parcel I (approximately 5 acres) and Parcel II (approximately 15 acres), but 
created two new parcels from the whole of the approximately 20 acres. Pandrea received 12. 739 
acres ("Pandrea Parcel") and Clark received 10.423 acres ("Clark Parcel"). Because the 
boundaries of the parcels had changed, the metes-and-bounds description in the Clark Estates 
Easement did not reach the newly-created Clark Parcel so the district court created an easement 
that connects to the existing Clark Estates Easement from the southern end of the Pandrea Parcel 
and continues north across the Pandrea Parcel, as the servient estate, to the Clark Parcel, as the 
dominant estate ("Clark Easement"). Id. The Clark Easement is described in the Partition 
Judgment and is shown in Exhibit A to the Partition Judgment, which is a survey of the new 
Pandrea Parcel and the new Clark Parcel ("Partition Survey"). Id., p. 143. The Partition Survey 
is reproduced on page 12 below, and a copy of the survey taken from the record is also included 
in the Appendix as Exhibit B. For easy identification, the Clark Parcel is colored in yellow, the 
Pandrea Parcel in orange, the Thornton Parcel in green, the easement in blue, and the county 
road in pink. 
11 
This is the new easement created by the 
Partition Judgment to provide access to 
rt-- -6!- -------liiin• Clark's new pacel (the dooinant estate) 
._. . ...., 
·--·----~~ ••nmte ..... .., 
·-tsw. -~ 
Enlargement of area In 
box on survey to show 
where new Clark 
easement connects to 
existing Clark Estates 
Easement 
R. Vol. I, p. 143. 
across Pandrea's Parcel (the servient 
estate). On the soulh end it connects with "-=::E:====-
the existing Clark Estaes Easement, ... 
which continues on across the Thornton 
Parcel to reach the county road. 
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II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether Respondents Barretts should be awarded attorney fees on appeal. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Introduction 
In his Appellant's Brief, Thornton raises 11 "Issues on Appeal." Contained within these 
11 stated issues he lists an additional 13 sub-issues. After reviewing Thornton's numerous 
issues, Respondents Barretts find that for simplicity's sake, Thornton's issues can be narrowed 
down to more effectively address his primary issue, which is the district court's summary 
judgment finding that Clark (and now her successors in interest, the Barretts) possess an express 
appurtenant easement across Thornton's Parcel. 
From that primary issue, Thornton's other issues emerge. Those issues can be narrowed 
down as well. Thornton assigns error to the district court's (1) finding that he intentionally 
interfered with Clark's easement, (2) its award of attorney fees and Rule 11 sanctions, and (3) its 
substitution of the Barretts in the stead of Clark. Respondents Barretts' Brief is arranged to 
respond to each of these issues and addresses, where necessary, Thornton's various other 
superfluous issues which emerge from those main issues. 
In the Intervenor's Brief, the Intervenor identifies five issues on appeal, four of which 
find error with the district court's award of sanctions against the Intervenor, and which 
arguments mirror the Appellant's arguments on these issues. The Intervenor additionally 
requests that this Court award I.A.R. 11.2 sanctions against the Barretts. 
Respondents Barretts address both the Appellant's and the Intervenor's arguments in 
their brief. 
B. The district court properly found that Clark possesses an express 
appurtenant easement across Thornton's Parcel. 
Both Appellant and Respondents Barretts agree that by way of the Wiltse Deed that 
Pandrea and Clark reserved an easement across the land that is now Thornton's. Appellant's 
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Brief, pp. 3-4. Thornton and the Barretts additionally agree that Pandrea and Clark jointly 
owned two contiguous parcels - Parcel I and Parcel II 10 - at the time they conveyed the land to 
Wiltse/Pandrea by way of the Wiltse Deed. Id., p. 13. They further agree that Pandrea and Clark 
conveyed portions of both Parcel I and Parcel II to Wiltse/Pandrea in the Wiltse Deed. Id., pp. 3, 
13. Finally, Thornton and the Barretts agree that the Wiltse Deed does not specifically identify a 
dominant estate. R. Vol. I, p. 172. 
What the parties do not agree upon is the crux of the entire appeal, namely, what is the 
dominant estate that the Thornton Parcel is subject to? The district court found that the dominant 
estate included the entirety of the property jointly-owned by Pandrea and Clark at the time they 
reserved the easement, and it is from this decision that Thornton appeals. In his Appellant's 
Brief, Thornton contends that the easement was reserved by Pandrea and Clark exclusively to 
serve their Parcel I. Id., p. 17. Respondents Barretts contend that by the plain language of the 
Wiltse Deed, Pandrea and Clark made known their intent that the easement would serve the 
entirety of the dominant estate, which includes both Parcel I and Parcel II. The Barretts therefore 
respectfully request that this Court confirm the judgment of the district court. 
1. The district court properly found that the dominant parcel was the property 
that Clark and Pandrea jointly owned at the time they reserved the 
easement. 
The district court granted Clark's Motion for Summary Judgment wherein she sought "a 
determination by the Court that she has an easement appurtenant across the Thornton Property 
according to the language of Warranty Deed, Bonner County Instrument No. 525386 ['Thornton 
Deed'] and Quitclaim Deed, Bonner County Instrument No. 416381 ['Wiltse Deed']." R. Vol. 
II, p. 275. 
10 As Respondents identified in their Statement of Facts, Thornton, in the Appellant's Briefrefers 
to Parcel I (and the wholly new parcel partitioned to Pandrea in 2014) as Parcel B. He refers to 
Parcel II (and the wholly new parcel partitioned to Clark in 2014) as Parcel C. 
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a) Summarization of Thornton's arguments that Clark does not 
possess an appurtenant easement. 
When Thornton filed his Complaint in the underlying action, he asserted that Pandrea had 
an easement in gross, and also claimed that Clark owned no easement whatsoever. He asserted 
that "the said dirt driveway was an easement in gross for the benefit of Defendant Mary Pandrea 
only." R. Vol. I, p. 34, ,r 2.17. He also asserted that "there is no easement ofrecord describing 
any dominant parcel ofland or suggesting anything other than an easement in gross." Id., ,i 2.19. 
In his response to Clark's Motion for Summary Judgment, Thornton abandoned his original 
position that Pandrea held only an easement in gross and conceded that "the Pandrea parcel is 
adjacent to his property, and therefore recognizes that the court seems to have determined, in 
effect, that Mary Pandrea has an easement appurtenant." R. Vol. I, p. 173. With respect to 
Clark, however, Thornton argued on summary judgment that "whether the easement is 
appurtenant or in gross, Kari Clark no longer owns Tax Lot 4011 , and therefore no longer owns 
the easement rights appurtenant to Tax Lot 40." R. Vol. I, p. 172. He argued that "[t]he 
language upon which Kari Clark relies does not describe a dominant estate and does not pretend 
to pass on to the heirs and assigns of the grantors." Id. 
In a continuation of the arguments he made during summary judgment, Thornton asserts 
now in his Appellant's Brief that Parcel I is the dominant estate to the easement that crosses his 
property. He claims that "the Quit-Claim Deed [Wiltse Deed] conveyed the respective 
southeasterly portions of two separate properties [Parcel I and Parcel II], and that the easement 
was only appurtenant to one of them." Appellant's Brief, p. 13. 
b) The reserved easement is appurtenant to the entire dominant estate 
and is apportionable among subsequent owners after division. 
"An easement appurtenant serves the entire dominant estate and is apportionable among 
subsequent owners if the dominant estate is divided.... Unless limited by the terms or the 
manner of its creation, the right to use an easement appurtenant extends to each subdivided 
11 In the underlying district court case, Thornton sometimes referred to Parcel I as "Tax Lot 40." 
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portion of the dominant estate." James Ely Jr. and Jon Bruce, The Law of Easements & Licenses 
in Land,§ 9.3; accord McFadden v. Sein, 139 Idaho 921, 924 (2004) (general grant or 
reservation of easement includes right to use easement after subdivision of dominant estate). 
As the record demonstrates, in this case, we have not one but three general reservations 
of easement in the chain of title that create an easement in favor of the Barretts' property, and 
which burden the Thornton property. These include the Parcel I Deed from 1980 (R. Vol. 2, p. 
373), the Wiltse Deed from 1992 (R. Vol. I., pp. 128-129), and the Thornton Deed from 1998. 
R. Vol. 1, p. 134. 
Thornton fails to recognize that the Parcel I Deed conveyed the land that would later 
become Thornton's property, and expressly reserved through the land that was conveyed "a 30.0 
foot easement for a road right-of-way and utilities" which included the reserved easement's 
metes and bounds description. R. Vol. 2, p. 3 73. The Wiltse Deed also contained an express 
general reservation of easement, which parrots the same legal description from the easement 
created in 1980 by way of the Parcel I Deed. R. Vol. I, pp. 128-129. In the case of the 1980 
Parcel I Deed, it benefited the upstream property owned by the grantor, the Harry F. and Edith E. 
Clark Trust, which would later be divided and eventually conveyed to Clark. The 1992 Wiltse 
Deed simply re-stated and clarified that the conveyance was "Subject to and reserving a 30.0 foot 
easement for a road right of way and utilities ... " R. Vol. I, pp. 128-129. Therefore, when 
Thornton came into ownership by way of the 1998 grant from Wiltse to Thornton (the "Thornton 
Deed"), Thornton's property would have been subject to and burdened by the pre-existing 
easement even if there was no reservation of the easement. However, the grant to Thornton 
actually included as part of the legal description the language that it was "Subject to ... 
Easement and conditions ... in favor of: Mary E. Pandrea ... and Kari A. Clark." R. Vol. 1, p. 
134. The easements in the Wiltse Deed to Thornton also expressly referenced Bonner County 
Instrument No. 416381, which is the 1992 Wiltse Deed. In other words, there are three expressly 
created easements burdening Thornton's property, and benefitting the Barretts' "upstream" 
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property. The district court based its decision primarily on the Thornton Deed, but it could just 
as easily have based its decision entirely on either the Wiltse Deed, or the Parcel I Deed. 
c) The district court applied the correct standards in granting 
summary iudgment in favor of Clark and in denying Thornton's 
motion to reconsider. 
The district court addressed Thornton's arguments in its decision granting Clark's 
summary judgment motion. It stated: 
In this case, the Warranty Deed conveying the two acre parcel of land to Thornton 
contained the following language establishing an easement is as follows: 
EASEMENT AND CONDITIONS THEREOF RESERVED BY 
INSTRUMENT 
IN FAVOR OF: MARYE. PANDREA WILTSE, A MARRIED 
WOMAN DEALING IN HER SOLE AND SEPARATE PROPERTY; 
AND KARI A. CLARK, A SINGLE WOMAN 
FOR: A 30.0 FOOT EASEMENT FOR A ROAD 
RIGHT OF WAY AND UTILITIES 
RECORDED: DECEMBER 1, 1992 
INSURYMENT [sic] NO.: 416381 
Contrary to the contention of Pandrea and Thornton, the above language does not 
grant an easement specifically to "Tax Lot 40". Neither Pandrea nor Thornton 
have submitted any admissible evidence depicting Tax Lot 40 or describing Tax 
Lot 40 by a metes and bounds description. 
*** 
But even if there was admissible evidence describing Tax Lot 40, the 
easement at issue in this case simply does not refer to Tax Lot 40. It grants a 
thirty-foot easement for a road right of way and utilities to Mary E. Pandrea 
and Kari Clark for a right of way and use of utilities which serves their land, 
not specifically the land of Tax Lot 40. Both Thornton and Pandrea are very 
mistaken in their argument linking the easement in favor of Pandrea and 
Clark to Tax Lot 40. The link simply does not exist. 
R. Vol. II., pp. 279-280. (Italics in original, bold added). 
Thornton makes much ado in his Appellant's Brief about the fact that Pandrea's and 
Clark's jointly-owned property consisted of two parcels - not one. What Thornton does not 
appear to understand is that the district court's finding that the easement served the entirety of 
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Clark's and Pandrea's property was not because the court viewed their two contiguous jointly-
owned parcels as one, but because as it stated in its decision, "(c]ontrary to the contention of 
Pandrea and Thornton, the [easement] language [in the Thornton Deed] does not grant an 
easement specifically to 'Tax Lot 40'." R., Vol. II, p. 280. The district court found that the 
Thornton Deed "grants a thirty-foot easement for a road right of way and utilities to Mary E. 
Pandrea and Kari Clark for a right of way and use of utilities which serves their land, not 
specifically the land of Tax Lot 40." R. Vol. II, p. 280. At the time of the grant, the land they 
owned was of record, and included both Parcels I and II. 
The district court acknowledged, as do Thornton and the Barretts, that the Wiltse Deed 
did not identify a dominant estate, stating: 
[T]here is indisputable evidence that the language provided above created an 
easement appurtenant. While the language of the easement identifies no dominant 
or servient estate, it gives a right of access to Pandrea and Clark for a road right of 
way and for utilities, which serves the land directly as opposed to Pandrea and 
Clark personally. However, even if the Court finds that there is a doubt whether 
this language creates an easement appurtenant, the presumption in Idaho rests in 
favor of finding that an easement appurtenant was created. 
R. Vol. II, p. 281. (Emphasis in original). 
Despite the fact that the Wiltse Deed did not explicitly identify a dominant estate, 
Thornton asked the district court to reconsider its decision and restrict the easement in ways the 
conveyance did not. He continued to insist that the deed provided that the easement solely 
served Parcel I but rather than relying on the plain language of the deed, he submitted extrinsic 
evidence in support of his claim. 
d) Because the Wiltse Deed is unambiguous, it was not necessary nor 
proper to consider extrinsic evidence to determine Pandrea 's and 
Clark's intent, and the district court properly declined to do so. 
Thornton has at no time claimed that the Wiltse Deed was ambiguous and, in fact, in his 
Appellant's Brief~ he states that the language contained in the deed is "unambiguous." 
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Appellant's Brief, p. 13. Nonetheless, as Thornton explains in his Appellant's Brief, "in support 
of his motion to reconsider," he submitted the following: 
Id., p. 12. 
• "his own sworn testimony as to the use of the Easement"; 
• "the affidavit of Mary Pandrea, attesting to the accuracy of his illustrative maps 
showing the boundaries and ownership of the properties before and after the 1992 
conveyance that reserved the right to the easement"; 
• "a certified copy of Clark's Answer and Counterclaim filed in the Partition 
Action, wherein she alleges, under oath, that her fifteen acre parcel remained 
separate and distinct from Pandrea's five acre parcel"; 
• "certified copies of survey maps showing the three separate parcels"; 
• "certified copies of Clark's and Pandrea' s deeds to their respective parcels"; and 
• "a certified copy of the Quitclaim Deed creating the Easement." 
The district court acknowledged that Thornton submitted these documents, but found that 
they did "nothing to dispute the language of the [Thornton Deed or the Wiltse Deed]." R. Vol. 
III, p. 53 8. When a deed is unambiguous, the intention of the parties must be ascertained from 
the deed itself. In the case of Currie v. Walkinshaw, 113 Idaho 586, 746 P. 2d 1045 (Ct. App. 
1987), the Idaho Court of Appeals explained: 
In construing a deed the court should seek and, if possible, give effect to the 
intention of the parties. If the language of a deed is plain and unambiguous 
the intention of the parties must be ascertained from the deed, and parol 
evidence, that is, documentary, oral or real evidence extrinsic to the deed 
itself, is not admissible to ascertain intent. 
Id. at 1048. (Citations omitted) (Emphasis added). 
l The Wiltse Deed makes clear what Clark and Pandrea 's 
intentions were when they reserved the easement. 
In Quinn v. Stone, 75 Idaho 243,270 P. 2d 825 (Idaho 1954), the Quinn court explained 
the general rule regarding interpreting an easement, stating that "' [i]n describing an easement, all 
that is required is a description which identifies the land which is the subject of the easement, 
and expresses the intention of the parties."' Id. at 826-827. In our case, the Thornton Deed 
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identifies the land which is the subject of the easement, that being the Thornton Parcel. Further, 
the Thornton Deed expresses the intent of the parties, that is that it is "in favor of Pandrea and 
Clark" for "a 30.0 foot easement for a road right of way and utilities." R. Vol. I, pp. 132-135. 
The property owned by Pandrea and Clark as of that date was a matter of record and nothing 
about the grant is ambiguous. The reservation was for "road right of way and utilities" which 
clearly demonstrates the intent of the parties was that it would serve the individuals' property, 
not the individuals personally. 
Despite Thornton's contention that the easement was created to solely serve Parcel I, 
there is no language whatsoever in the Wiltse Deed nor the Thornton Deed to support his 
assertion. In his brief, Thornton avoids citing to the actual language of the deeds. He states: 
"Within the property description of the Shoreline Piece is found language reserving 'to the 
granters' the right to continue using the driveway." Appellant's Brief, p. 4. The word 
"driveway" does not show up in the deed. The Wiltse Deed provides an unambiguous 
description of the easement that Pandrea and Clark reserved therein as follows: 
Subject to and reserving a 30.0 foot easement for a road right-of-way and 
utilities, more fully described as follows: ... to the point of beginning; thence S. 
59°03'17"E, a distance of 637.22 feet; thence S. 58°03'22" E. a distance of300.0 
feet more or less to the easterly right-of-way of the Pack River County Road. 
R. Vol. I, pp. 128-129. (Emphasis added). 
This easement description- from the point of beginning until its terminus -matches up 
exactly to the easement shown on the 1979 Clark Survey (reproduced below for the Court's 
convenience). R. Vol. II, p. 440. 
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This tells us all we need to know about Pandrea' s and Clark's intent. The fact that the 
easement description begins on Parcel II, and traverses from there across Parcel I, and then 
traverses the Thornton Parcel makes it clear that Pandrea and Clark intended that it would serve 
both of these parcels that they jointly owned when they reserved the easement. Thornton was on 
notice of this because the unambiguous description was contained in the Wiltse Deed, which was 
referenced in the Thornton Deed. The Idaho Supreme Court makes this clear in Akers v. D.L. 
White Construction, Inc., 142 Idaho 1178, 127 P.3d 196 (2005). 
"One who purchases land expressly subject to an easement, or with notice, actual 
or constructive, that it is burdened with an existing easement, takes the land 
subject to the easement." Checketts v. Thompson, 65 Idaho 715, 721, 152 P.2d 
585, 587 (1944) . An express easement may be by way of reservation or by 
exception. 7 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, THOMAS EDITION § 
60.03(a)(2)(i) (David A. Thomas ed., 1994). 
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Id. at 204. 
The Wiltse Deed in no way limits the easement solely to "Tax Lot 40" (aka "Parcel 
B"/aka Parcel I). If Clark and Pandrea intended the easement to solely serve Parcel I, surely they 
would have explicitly indicated that in the language of the conveyance. But they did not do that. 
Instead, they specifically included the portion of the easement that extends across Parcel I to 
reach Parcel II, to wit: "to the point of beginning; thence S. 59°03'1 ?"E, a distance of 637.22 
feet." Thus, Thornton's argument that the easement was reserved solely for Parcel I is contrary 
to the plain language of the deed. 
The district court addressed Thornton's refusal to address the language of the deeds and 
his attempt to instead ask the court to consider irrelevant documents as follows: 
Clark further requests that this Court strike the Affidavits of Pandrea and 
Thornton in support of the Motion for Reconsideration, as she claims they are 
irrelevant as to whether Clark has an easement appurtenant to the Thornton 
Property, the maps hand-drawn by Thornton are without foundation, and the 
legal descriptions contacted [sic] within deeds speak for themselves. Id., pp. 
3, 4. The Court will not strike Thornton's affidavit. While Thornton's affidavit 
provides no relevant evidence to rebut the express easement of record Clark 
has across Thornton's land, Thornton's affidavit is relevant to show the 
absurd lengths he is willing to travel to try and trump Clark's easement. 
Drawing twelve maps with colored pencils in an attempt to show what happened 
at various times in history, does nothing to change the fact that Clark has a written 
express easement across Thornton's land. 
In the underlying motion, Clark sought a determination by the Court that she had 
an easement appurtenant across the Thornton Property according to the language 
of Warranty Deed, Bonner County Instrument No. 525386, and Quitclaim Deed, 
Bonner County Instrument No. 416381. [Citations omitted]. At no time in this 
litigation, from its inception by Thornton to the current time, does Thornton 
address the actual language of these documents. When Thornton filed his 
Complaint to Quiet Title and for Damages, he breathed not a word about 
Clark's recorded express easement. Throughout summary judgment, 
Thornton refused to discuss that easement, instead he chose to make 
irrelevant arguments to the Court. Now, Thornton supplies the Court with 
additional documents that do nothing to dispute the language of Warranty 
Deed, Bonner County Instrument No. 525386, and Quitclaim Deed, Bonner 
County Instrument No. 41638 [sic]. The hand-illustrated maps made by John 
Thornton alleging to depict the properties and easements involved in this case are 
of no relevance. Clark shifted the burden to Thornton to show that there is a 
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genuine issue of material fact and Thornton has failed to meet his burden via 
admissible and relevant evidence. 
R. Vol. III, pp. 537-538. (Emphasis added.) 
e) The legal effect of an unambiguous deed must be decided by the 
trial court as a question oflaw and summary iudgment was, thus, 
proper in this case. 
Thornton admits the Wiltse Deed is unambiguous yet still insists that this "matter should 
be submitted to a jury." Appellant's Brief, p. 12. He asserts that it was an abuse of discretion for 
the district court to determine factual issues on summary judgment when the matter was set for a 
jury trial. Appellant's Brief, p. 12. Thornton's assertion is erroneous. In Machado v. Ryan, 153 
Idaho 212,280 P.3d 715 (2012), this Court verifies that because the Wiltse Deed, which reserved 
the easement is unambiguous, this matter was properly decided by the trial court as a question of 
law. 
"The legal effect of an unambiguous written document must be decided by the 
trial court as a question oflaw." Mountainview Landowners, 139 Idaho at 772, 86 
P.3d at 486 (quoting Latham v. Garner, 105 Idaho 854,857,673 P.2d 1048, 1051 
(1983) ). "If, however, the instrument of conveyance is ambiguous, interpretation 
of the instrument is a matter of fact for the trier of fact." Id. 
Id. at 720-721. 
The district court explained that "Clark [had] shifted the burden to Thornton to show that 
there [was] a genuine issue of material fact and Thornton ha[ d] failed to meet his burden via 
admissible and relevant evidence." R. Vol. III, p. 538. This Court has confirmed that: 
Summary judgment must be granted 'if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). 
Ida-Therm, LLC v. Bedrock Geothermal, LLC, 154 Idaho 6,293 P. 3d 630,632 (2012). 
Thus, the district court correctly found that because there was no genuine issue of 
material fact, summary judgment was appropriate in this case. 
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f) Thornton has doctored the record on appeal to mislead this Court 
as to the (act that the easement was intended to serve Parcel II. 
As Respondents Barretts pointed out in their Statement of Facts (Section I(C)(2), pp. 3-
4 ), Thornton has doctored the exhibits he has appended to his brief (his "Map One" and "Map 
Two"). In doing so, he has notably removed the portion of the easement discussed in the Wiltse 
Deed that extends across Parcel I and reaches Parcel II. While the Barretts agree with the district 
court's finding that "[t]he hand-illustrated maps made by John Thornton alleging to depict the 
properties and easement involved in this case are of no relevance" (R. Vol. III, p. 538), it is 
worth pointing out that in the documents Thornton submitted to the district court, which are of 
record, he had included in his drawings the portion of the easement that crosses Parcel I but has 
now purposefully removed it. This doctoring of the record on appeal can be viewed as nothing 
less than an attempt to underhandedly bolster his arguments and mislead this Court12• 
Similarly, in the underlying case, Thornton withheld pertinent information from the 
district court when he filed his Complaint and attached to it what he alleged was the legal 
description of the property he owned. The document he attached to his Complaint was not a 
copy of the Thornton Deed, however. The purported legal description of his property was a 
document that he had typed up and from which he had notably removed the language which 
referenced the easement. The part that he removed was the part that stated in all caps the 
following: "EASEMENT AND CONDITIONS THEREOF RESERVED BY 
INSTRUMENT ... IN FAVOR OF: MARYE. PANDREA ... AND KARI A. CLARK ... FOR: A 
30.0 FOOT EASEMENT FOR A ROAD RIGHT OF WAY AND UTILITIES." R. Vol. I, pp. 
38-39. 
In its decision denying Thornton's motion to reconsider and granting Clark's request for 
attorney fees and costs, the district court addressed Thornton's failure to provide evidence of the 
easement when he filed his Complaint (R. Vol. II, p. 538) and indicated that "Ms. Thornton's 
12 See page 4 in the Statement of Facts, where Respondents compare the documents of record to 
Thornton's doctored "Map One" and "Map Two" to see a side-by-side comparison of the 
changes that he made. 
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decision not to produce a copy of the very deed that this case turns around is - is part of the basis 
for this Court's awarding Rule 11 sanctions." Tr., p. 81, L. 16-19. 
Respondents argue in Section III(G) below that these actions of Thornton in 
misrepresenting the evidence before this Court, in addition to his ongoing frivolous approach to 
this litigation, also warrant the award of sanctions on appeal under Idaho Appellate Rule l l .2(a). 
C. The district court properly found that Thornton intentionally interfered with 
Clark's easement. 
In Clark's motion for summary judgment, she provided undisputed evidence that in 2013 
Thornton erected a locked gate across the easement road through his property and posted a sign 
that stated: "NOTICE KARI CLARK is prohibited from entering upon this property for any 
reason under penalty of criminal trespass. LC. 18-7011. John F. Thornton, 4685 Upper Pack 
River Road, Sandpoint, Idaho 83864, Owner." R. Vol. I, pp. 115-116, 146. A photograph of the 
sign that Thornton placed on his property can be found at R. Vol. I, p. 156. 
In her motion for summary judgment, Clark additionally provided undisputed evidence 
that on July 20, 2013, Clark and her family attempted to access her property through the 
easement road on Thornton's property but when they reached the gate that Thornton had erected, 
they were stopped by Thornton and his wife/attorney, Val Thornton, the Intervenor herein. R. 
Vol. I, p. 146. When Thornton stopped Clark, it was just after a memorial service held for 
Clark's son had concluded. Clark was headed to her property and further up the mountain to 
scatter Clark's son's ashes upon the same site where Clark's father is buried. Id. Thornton and 
the Intervenor would not permit Clark and her family members to pass through the gate unless 
they first signed a document they presented the Clarks with. Id. Clark was visibly distraught 
and did not want to sign the document. However, even though Clark was represented by counsel 
at the time, Intervenor Val Thornton demanded that she sign or she would not be allowed to 
access her property and continue with the ash-scattering portion of the service. Id. A 
photograph taken that day showing Thornton and Intervenor forcing Clark to sign the document 
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can be found in the record at Vol. I, p. 160. The document Thornton and the Intervenor forced 
Clark to sign can be found at Vol. I, p. 162. 
Thornton did not dispute the above-stated facts in his opposition to Clark's motion for 
summary judgment. Instead, he attempted to defend his actions and deflect blame, as follows: 
John Thornton has a right to question those who claim to have the right to cross 
his property, and it is not unreasonabie to ask for identification and verification of 
such claims ... When he learned that Kari Clark claimed a right to use the 
easement, he immediately requested to be informed of the basis thereof, and 
notified Richard Kuck, her attorney in the partition matter (CV-2011-835) that she 
would be trespassed from the property unless she provided a legal basis for her 
claim ... Thornton further agreed with Richard Kuck to give Kari Clark permissive 
use of the easement to visit the gravesite on July 20, 2013 ... Kari Clark's attorney 
Richard Kuck agreed to write a letter of agreement regarding permission to use 
the easement on that day, but failed to do so. Instead, Kari Clark appeared at the 
locked gate, and was permitted to use the easement. 
R. Vol. I,pp. 176-177. 
The district court addressed Thornton's actions in erecting the locked gate, putting up the 
threatening sign, and blocking Clark's access that day: 
Thornton claims he was unaware of the easement rights of Clark, yet the 
Warranty Deed conveying the two acre parcel of land to Thornton contained the 
following language establishing an easement as follows: 
INSTRUMENT 
IN FAVOR OF: MARYE. PANDREA WILTSE, A MARRIED 
WOMAN DEALING IN HER SOLE AND SEPARATE PROPERTY; 
AND KARI A. CLARK, A SINGLE WOMAN 
FOR: A 30.0 FOOT EASEMENT FOR A ROAD 
RIGHT OF WAY AND UTILITIES 
RECORDED: DECEMBER 1, 1992 
INSURYMENT [sic] NO.: 416381 
Affidavit of Joel P. Hazel, Exhibit B ( emphasis added). The Warranty Deed 
conveying the Thornton Property to Thornton put Thornton on notice that Clark 
had an easement. In spite of this, Thornton erected a locked gate across the 
easement road and posted a sign dated July 5, 2013, next to the gate, which read 
as follows: 
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NOTICE 
KARICLARK 
IS PROHIBITED FROM ENTERING UPON THIS PROPERTY FOR ANY 
REASON UNDER PENALTY OF CRIMINAL TRESPASS. I.C. § 18-7001. 
JOHNF. THORNTON 
4685 UPPER PACK RIVER ROAD 
SANDPOINT IDAHO 83864 
OWNER 
*** 
As mentioned above, Thornton's failure to read and comprehend what is ofrecord 
( or if he read his deed at the time, his refusal to abide by the language in his 
deed), the written easement, is troubling to the Court. Nearly a year ago, 
Thornton's in July 2013 of excluding Clark from using her easement, was simply 
wrong. Thornton had no legal right to do so. But today, Thornton has obviously 
read his deed. Thornton can no longer claim ignorance. And for Thornton to 
today claim that "John Thornton has a right to question those who claim to have 
the right to cross his property, and it is not unreasonable to ask for identification 
and verification of such claim ... " .. .is absolutely incredible ... Thornton's attorney 
also argued at the March 14, 2014, hearing that "A landowner has a right to 
approach a person that you have never met before." Such argument is 
disingenuous given the fact that fifteen days before meeting Clark and 
confronting Clark, Thornton, on July 5, 2013, put up the following sign: 
*** 
NOTICE 
KARICLARK 
IS PROHIBITED FROM ENTERING UPON THIS PROPERTY FOR ANY 
REASON UNDER PENALTY OF CRIMINAL TRESPASS. I.C. § 18-7001. 
Why would Thornton place such a sign if he had never met Kari Clark or at least 
knew who Kari Clark was, and knew Kari Clark claimed some right to cross his 
property? 
R. Vol. II, pp. 283-286. (Emphasis in original). 
Having found that Thornton had an express appurtenant easement across Thornton's 
property, it followed that the district court would find ( and did find) that "Thornton interfered 
with that right when he erected a locked gate." R. Vol. II, p. 286. 
On appeal, Thornton again attempts to deflect blame and defend his and his 
attorney's/spouse's actions in wrongfully blocking Clark's access. He claims, "[i]n this case, it 
is Clark, not Thornton, who is at fault." Appellant's Brief, p. 29. Despite Thornton's excuses, 
his actions in erecting a locked gate, placing a sign next to it that threatens Clark with criminal 
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trespass, and not allowing Clark to pass by the gate without signing a document cannot be 
perceived as anything but intentional. It is exactly this type of forceful self-help that is frowned 
upon in Idaho. See, e.g., Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho 851, 864 (2010). The same can also be said 
of attorney Val Thornton's ex parte communications with Clark. See, e.g., Runsvold v. Idaho 
State Bar, 129 Idaho 419, 421-22 (1996) (attorney may not communicate with opposing party 
about the subject of representation); LR.P.C. 4.2 (same). 
Additionally, Thornton's claim that "Clark's allegations concerned one occasion, 
occurring afier Clark's interest in Parcel B was extinguished by the partition ruling," is false. 
Id. (Emphasis added). It is false because the sign was posted well before the July 20, 2013 
confrontation (the sign was dated "July 5, 2013"). It is also false because Clark still held an 
undivided interest in Parcel 1 until judgment was entered in the Partition Action on January 24, 
2014. It was not until this date that Parcels I and II were reconfigured into the Pandrea Parcel 
and the Clark Parcel. R. Vol. I, pp. 137-143. Thus, even if the district court had adopted 
Thornton's arguments and not found that Clark had an appurtenant easement after partition of the 
jointly-owned parcels, Clark's and Pandrea's rights in Parcels I and II were identical on July 20, 
2013 and continued to be identical until January 24, 2014. Thornton was wrong on July 20, 2013 
and on every day that he prevented Clark from accessing her property due to his locked gate. 
His actions were undeniably intentional and the district court properly so found. 
D. The district court's award of attorney fees against Thornton under I.C. § 12-
121 and Rule 11 sanctions against both Thornton and the Intervenor were 
proper. 
The district court's decision to award attorney fees under Idaho Code 12-121 and impose 
sanctions under Rule 11 are subject to the abuse of discretion standard of review. Urrutia v. 
Harrison, 156 Idaho 677, 680 (2014); Bailey v. Sanford, 139 Idaho 744, 745, 86 P.3d 458,467 
(2004); Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94 (1991). Therefore, 
the sequence of inquiry is ( l) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and 
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consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) 
whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., 
Inc. at 94. For the reasons set forth below, Thornton has not shown that the district court abused 
its discretion and its decision should therefore be upheld. 
1. The district court found that Clark was the prevailing party and based on 
its discretion to do so, properly awarded her attorney fees and costs 
pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e )(1) provides in pertinent part: 
In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees ... when provided 
for by any statute or contract. Provided, attorney fees under section 12-121, 
Idaho Code, may be awarded by the court only when it finds, from the 
facts presented to it, that the case was brought, pursued or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. 
In her motion requesting attorney fees, Clark gave a variety of reasons to support her 
assertions that "the frivolity and unreasonableness of Thornton's positions throughout this 
litigation is unquestionable." R. Vol. III, p. 478. 
Clark addressed the frivolity of Thornton's changing arguments. 
Thornton's initial position in this litigation was that Pandrea had an easement in 
gross across Thornton's property, but Clark had no easement rights. Thornton 
made this frivolous assertion despite the fact that the Warranty Deed conveying 
the property to Thornton specifically stated that he conveyance was subject to "A 
30.0 FOOT EASEMENT FOR A ROAD RIGHT OF WAY AND UTILITIES" in 
favor of"MARY E. PANDREA WILTSE" and "KARI A. CLARK." 
Id. (Emphasis added). 
Clark explained how Thornton abandoned his frivolous "easement in gross" argument 
and instead unreasonably pursued another position with no factual basis. 
After this Court indicated in its ruling on Pandrea' s Motion to Dismiss that both 
Clark and Pandrea had an appurtenant easement across the Thornton Property 
based on the clear language of the deeds at issue, Thornton then changed his 
position and argued that any easement across his property only served "Tax Lot 
40." However, like Thornton's other claims in this litigation, there was absolutely 
no basis to support such an argument and his assertions can only be viewed as 
an attempt to harass Clark and to increase Clark's costs in this case. 
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Id. (Emphasis added). 
Clark also pointed out another of Thornton's frivolous arguments, which had no basis in 
the law. 
In addition, Thornton made the frivolous claim that an appurtenant easement 
must be adjacent to the property burdened. More specifically, Thornton's 
attorney stated, "the easement, if any, appertaining to the adjacent parcel only 
appertains to the adjacent parcel" Memorandum Decision, p. 16. 
R. Vol. III, p. 479. (Emphasis added). 
Clark explained how Thornton's actions were an obvious calculated course of conduct 
designed to harass Clark and to wear her down. 
Thornton's willful decision to ignore the plain language in the deeds and to 
wrongfully interfere with Clark's easement rights goes far beyond mere 
neglect and constitute a calculated course of conduct designed to harass 
Clark and wear her down with expenses and wasteful litigation. Thornton's 
conduct in interfering with Clark's property rights and the frivolous claims that he 
brought against Clark in this case are inexcusable. Not only was Thornton's 
conduct in violating Clark's property rights troubling, but his continued pursuit of 
his unreasonable claims against Clark without any foundation whatsoever is the 
very definition of frivolousness. Thornton's deleterious tactics should fail and 
Clark is entitled to an award of all of her attorney's fees [and] costs pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 54(d) and LC.§ 12-121. 
R. Vol. III, pp. 479-480. (Emphasis added). 
Clark also demonstrated how Thornton and the Intervenor worked in concert with 
Pandrea to harass Clark. 
The lawsuit that was brought by Thornton and his attorney against Clark goes 
above and beyond frivolous and constitutes vexatious litigation. Throughout 
the entirety of this case, Thornton and his attorney have purposefully driven up 
Clark's costs oflitigation by completely ignoring the plain language contained in 
two deeds of record describing Clark's easement rights and by seemingly 
working in concert with Pandrea to harass Clark. In addition, Thornton has 
attempted to utilize affidavits and documents provided by Pandrea in an 
effort to support Thornton's meritless claims even though Thornton is the 
Plaintiff and Pandrea is a co-defendant with Clark. 
R. Vol. III, p. 481. (Emphasis added). 
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At the hearing, the district court articulated its reasons for granting Clark's motion on the 
record. (Tr., p. 80, L. 8-10). It agreed that Clark's co-defendant, Pandrea, was acting in concert 
with Thornton, stating, "it's quite obvious that Pandrea and Thornton have been mirroring each 
other; Pandrea, you know, adopting virtually any argument that was made by Thornton." Tr., p. 
82, L. 24-24, p. 83, L. 1-2. The district court further stated that "the fact that Thornton would 
even bring this case in light of an express recorded easement that wasn't vague, that gave Clark 
all the right to cross this property it is - as Mr. Hazel quoting of Seinfeld, it's outrageous, it's 
egregious, it is preposterous. It's just absurd." Tr., p. 83, L. 8-13. 
a) The district court properly complied with IR.C.P. 54(e)(2) by 
providing this Court a clear understanding ofits decision to award 
fees to Clark. 
While Thornton is correct in his claim that when fees are awarded pursuant to LC. 12-
121, I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2) requires the court to make written findings as to the basis and reasons for 
awarding such fees, this standard was met. 
In the case of Snipes v. Schalo, 130 Idaho 890, 950 P. 2d 262 (Ct. App. 1997), the Snipes 
Court explained the purpose of the rule requiring the court to make written findings as to the 
basis and reasons for awarding fees under LC. 12-121. It states: 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e )(2) requires the district court, when it awards 
attorney fees pursuant to LC. § 12-121, to make written findings as to the basis 
and reasons for awarding the fees. The purpose of requiring the district court to 
make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law is to afford the appellate 
court a clear understanding of the district court's decision, so that it may be 
determined whether the district court applied the proper law to the appropriate 
facts in reaching its conclusion. Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., l 03 Idaho 217, 
225, 646 P .2d 988, 996 (1982). The absence of adequate findings and conclusions 
of law will require a reversal of the judgment and remand for additional findings 
and conclusions. Id. 
Id. at 265. 
In this case, the district court explained at the hearing on Clark's request for attorney fees 
and costs that it was "articulat[ing] its reasons [for granting Clark's motion] here on the record" 
and it proceeded to do so. Tr., p. 80, L. 8-10. The court reporter present at the hearing provided 
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a written transcript of the district court's decision and those written findings are contained in 
pages 65-87 of the Transcript on Appeal. As explained in Snipes v. Schalo, the purpose of 
requiring written findings is so the court's "specific findings of fact and conclusions oflaw" are 
on the record "to afford the appellate court a clear understanding of the district court's decision, 
so that it may be determined whether the district court applied the proper law to the appropriate 
facts in reaching its conclusion." Id. at 265. 
In this case, the district court's specific findings in the written transcript by which the 
court found "that under 12-121 that this case was brought frivolously" (Tr., p. 81, L. 1-2) 
include: 
• "Thornton's decision not to produce a copy of the very deed that this case 
turns around [which is] part of the reason why attorney's fees continued to 
accrue throughout the rest of the spring of 2014 up until the present date." 
Tr., p. 81, L. 16-22. 
• "The arguments [are] frivolous ... and nothing about arguing them time 
after time after time ... changes that fact. This is a written easement. It is 
recorded. It is appurtenant." Tr., p. 82, L. 5-9. 
• "The fact that Thornton would even bring this case in light of an express 
recorded easement that wasn't vague, that gave Clark the right to cross 
this property it is - as Mr. Hazel quoting Seinfeld, it's outrageous, it's 
egregious, it is preposterous. It's just absurd." Tr., p. 83, L. 8-13. 
• "You can't put a gate up when you don't have the right to keep that other 
person out, and - and that wrong has always been present ever since this 
case was filed, and Thornton, I am convinced, had he ever read his deed, 
knew that." Tr., p. 84, L. 6-10. 
The district court also stated during the hearing that it agreed "with everything that has 
been submitted by Mr. Hazel in his brief," and thereby effectively adopted and incorporated into 
the record the writing and all legal and factual positions of Mr. Hazel as part of its ruling. Tr., p. 
81, L. 6-7. 
The district court additionally made known its position that Thornton had brought his 
case frivolously in its written decision granting Clark's motion for summary judgment. It gave 
its reasons as follows: 
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Thornton's failure to read and comprehend what is ofrecord (or ifhe read his 
deed at the time, his refusal to abide by the language in his deed), the written 
easement, is troubling to the Court Nearly a year ago, Thornton's in July 2013 of 
excluding Clark from using her easement, was simply wrong. Thornton had no 
legal right to do so. But today, Thornton has obviously read his deed. Thornton 
can no longer claim ignorance. And for Thornton to today claim that "John 
Thornton has a right to question those who claim to have the right to cross his 
prnperty, aiid it is not unreasonable to ask for identification and verification of 
such claim ... " ... is absolutely incredible. Even more recently, after Thornton's 
affidavit and brief were filed, Thornton's attorney, at the March 14, 2014, hearing 
argued: "Thornton was never on any notice there was a right to use." Such 
argument completely ignores the purpose of Idaho's recording statutes. J.C. 
§ 55-811. How Thornton's attorney can make such a statement to the Court, 
is not capable of being understood. The fact that Thornton refused to submit 
proof of the fact of the recorded easement in the earlier motion for summary 
judgment brought by Pandrea, only illustrates the untenable position 
Thornton took not only on July 20, 2013, but throughout this litigation, and 
Thornton, and his attorney, obviously continue to adhere to up to the present 
time. Thornton cannot make the written easement go away by pretending it 
does not exist. Thornton's attorney cannot pretend Idaho's recording 
statutes do not exist. At the March 14, 2014, hearing, Thornton's attorney in 
concluding her oral argument, that Thornton's actions on July 20, 2013, and 
opposition to Clark's claims in this lawsuit " ... were not frivolous." The 
Court disagrees. 
R. Vol. II, pp. 284-285. (Emphasis added). 
b) Clark prevailed on all issues. 
Thornton alleges that Clark "dismissed and did not prevail on the issue of damages" and 
that Clark "did not prevail on the issue of quiet title to the Well Piece" and he argues that she is, 
therefore, not the prevailing party and that it is inappropriate to award attorney's fees in this case 
under LC. § 12-121. Appellant's Brief p. 31. In the underlying case, Clark was the prevailing 
party on all issues. Although Thornton claims Clark did not prevail on these two issues, neither 
of those issues are "legitimate, triable" issues. 
In the case of McGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 551, 82 P. 3d 833, (2003), this Court 
explained the general rule as to the allowance ofan attorney fee award under LC.§ 12-121: 
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[I]f there is a legitimate, triable issue of fact, attorney fees may not be awarded 
under I. C. § 12-121 even though the losing party has asserted factual or legal 
claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. 
Id. at 844. (Emphasis added). 
The "issue of quiet title of the Well Piece" was not a "triable" issue as it concerned Clark. 
In its decision granting summary judgment, the district court found that "there is no controversy 
between Thornton and Ciark regarding an interest in the W eii Piece" and that therefore that issue 
was moot. R. Vol. II, p. 287. The case of Freeman v. Idaho Dep 't of Correction, 138 Idaho 872, 
875, 71 P.3d 471,475 (Ct. App. 2003) confirms this is not a triable issue. The Idaho Court of 
Appeals explained therein that "[t]he general rule of mootness doctrine is that, to be justiciable, 
an issue must present a real and substantial controversy that is capable of being concluded 
through a judicial decree of specific relief." Id. Because this "Well Piece" issue was moot, it 
cannot be considered in determining whether Clark was the prevailing party. 
In regards to Clark's claim for damages against Thornton, it is true that Clark voluntarily 
dismissed this claim "in an effort to avoid further wasteful litigation costs." R., Vol. II, p. 297, 
Vol. III, p. 487. However, she prevailed in establishing that she had an easement, and that 
Thornton's actions were unlawful because of this. Because she did so, this issue also did not 
present a "triable issue of fact" that Thornton had to defend against. Following summary 
judgment, Clark voluntarily dismissed this claim and a trial was never held. Thus, Clark was the 
prevailing party in all respects. 
2. The district court found that Thornton and the Intervenor violated I.R.C.P. 
1 l(a)(l) and thereby properly imposed sanctions on both of them. 
An award of sanctions under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1 l(a)(l) is reviewed on 
appeal under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power 
Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94 (1991). I.R.P.C. 1 l(a)(l) provides in pertinent part as follows: 
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate that the attorney 
or party has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of the 
signer's knowledge, information, and belief after reasonable inquiry it is well 
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the 
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extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed 
for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or 
needless increase in the cost oflitigation ... .lf a pleading, motion or other paper is 
signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, 
shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an 
appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or 
parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing 
of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
Id. (Emphasis added). 
During oral argument on Clark's motion for attorney's fees and costs, Clark's attorney 
informed the district court that "never in my twenty-year career [have I] asked for an award of 
attorney's fees against another lawyer, but in this case it's warranted." Tr., p. 73, L. 7-9. 
Thornton's frivolous actions throughout this case began with the filing of his Complaint, 
which Val Thornton typed up so as to purposefully remove and omit from the legal description 
the language of the reserved easement. As argued above, the frivolity of their arguments 
snowballed from there. However, the district court based its decision to award Rule 11 
Sanctions not only on the baselessness of Thornton's and the Intervenor's arguments at the 
outset, but instead it based the award on their continued adherence to demonstrably false facts, 
the Intervenor's misleading presentment of her client's claim, lack of candidness towards the 
tribunal, and dogged adherence to outrageous legal arguments. The district court agreed that this 
case was one where Rule 11 sanctions were appropriate and explained its reasons: 
[W]hat is truly amazing in this case is that had Ms. Thornton on behalf of her 
client, Mr. Thornton, produced a copy of the deed at the summary judgment phase 
involving Ms. Pandrea, this case would've been over at that time. Ms. 
Thornton's decision not to produce a copy of the very deed that this case 
turns around is - is part of the basis for this Court's awarding Rule 11 
sanctions, but it's also part of the reason why attorney's fees continued to accrue 
throughout the rest of the spring of 2014 up until the present date. I think had 
Ms. Thornton been candid on behalf of her client and candid to the Court, I 
think it's quite possible that Ms. Thornton could've avoided the imposition of 
sanctions under Rule 11, and certainly her and her client could've avoided the 
quite high attorney's fees that are being assessed against both of them jointly and 
severally: Mr. Thornton under 12-121 a.11d Ms. Thornton and Mr. Thornton under 
Rule 11. 
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The arguments ... are frivolous. There- and nothing about arguing them time 
after time after time again, Ms. Thornton, changes that fact. This is a written 
easement. It is recorded. It is appurtenant. 
Tr., p. 81, L. 12-25, p. 82, L. 1-9 
The district court addressed the obvious fact that Thornton's attorney, the Intervenor, had 
not made a reasonable inquiry of the facts. It stated: 
You can't put a gate up when you don't have the right to keep that other person 
out, and and that wrong had always been present ever since this case was filed, 
and Thornton, I am convinced, had he ever read his deed, knew that, and Ms. 
Thornton had a duty to research that deed and know the contents of that 
deed and know the legal significance of that deed. 
Tr., p. 84, L. 7-13. (Emphasis added). 
The district court found "that under 12-121 that this case was brought frivolously, and 
under Rule 11 [ found] that both Ms. Thornton and her husband, her client, filed pleadings that 
aren't well-grounded in fact [or] a reasonable extension of the law." Tr., p. 81, L. 1-5. Because 
the district court found that Thornton and the Intervenor signed documents in violation of Rule 
11, the rule provides that it "shall" impose an appropriate sanction and it exercised its discretion 
and reasonably reached its decision by applying the appropriate legal standards to the facts of the 
case 
3. The district court properly considered the factors under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) 
in awarding attorney fees. 
Throughout this case up to the present time, the district court has made only one award of 
attorney fees. That award was in the amount of $41,530.17 and is the amount contained in the 
Amended Judgment of June 30, 2014 (R. Vol. III, pp. 579-583) and in the Second Amended 
Judgment entered February 25, 2015 13• 
Clark filed her Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs on May 12, 2014 in 
which she requested $41,530.17 in fees and costs (R. Vol. III, pp. 473-484). She also filed the 
13 See Document 9 to Respondents' Motion to Augment filed with this Court on December 28, 
2015 ("Respondents' Motion to Augment") - Second Amended Final Judgment entered 
February 25, 2015. 
36 
Affidavit/Memorandum of Joel P. Hazel in Support of Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and 
Costs in which she laid out the relevant factors of I.R.C.P. 54( e )(3). R. Vol. III, pp. 485-495. 
On June 24, 2014, Clark filed the Supplemental Affidavit of Jason M Gray in Support of Motion 
for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs, in which she requested an additional $4,539.93 for fees 
accrued after May 12, 2014. Thornton filed an objection and a motion to disallow Clark's 
attorney fees and costs on May 27, 2014. At the hearing on Clark's motion, the court began by 
explaining that it had read all of the parties' documents filed in support of and in opposition to 
Clark's motion, and listed the documents one-by-one. Tr., p. 66, L. 11-25, p. 67, L. 1-5. 
stating: 
During oral argument, Clark addressed the amount of the attorney's fees requested, 
Getting to the amounts of the attorney's fees, I'll admit they're more than they 
should be in this case, and they're more than they should be because of the 
Thorntons' approach to this litigation and Pandrea's approach to this litigation. 
An argument might be made that Thorntons shouldn't be responsible for the 
amount of work that we had to donate to or devote to dealing with Pandrea's 
pleadings in this case. However, Pandrea and Thornton, the evidence is pretty 
clear that they were working in tandem. Val Thornton would cite to affidavits 
filed by Pandrea. Pandrea would cite to arguments made by Thornton. They are 
neighbors. They live close to each other. It seems clear that despite Clark and 
Pandrea having exactly-aligned legal positions, that Thornton and Pandrea elected 
to get together in a cynical attempt to drive up the costs and attempt to harass Kari 
Clark into just conceding because it's just too dang expensive, and she did not. 
She had the wherewithal to see this through, and this court should make it right by 
awarding every penny of our fees set forth in the affidavits ofme and Jason Gray, 
together with $66 in court costs. The total of that amount of both affidavits is 
$46,070.64. Again, I'd like this court to send a message to Ms. Thornton and her 
husband that they do not get to litigate for free just because you have a law 
license. 
Tr., p. 73, L. 10-25, p. 74, L. 1-11. 
At that hearing, district court stated, "I am granting the motion for attorney's fees and 
costs in the amount requested by Mr. Hazel in his original affidavit, both as to fees and costs, 
and I think the- the issue as to the supplemental affidavit of Jason Gray is premature at this 
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time." Tr., p. 80, L. 10-15. (Emphasis added). The court also stated that "as to that additional 
$4,539.93 in fees, not costs, but fees the plaintiff is entitled fourteen days to object, and then if 
they do object, the matter can be noted up for hearing." Tr., p. 80, L. 15-18. No hearing was 
ever set regarding the additional $4,539.93, and the district court never awarded those additional 
fees to Clark. 
The district court explained its reasons for awarding the attorney fees and costs requested 
by Clark. It stated that it "agree[s] with everything that has been submitted by Mr. Hazel in his 
brief. I will try to keep my comments to a minimum, but in addition to those arguments made 
in ... Clark's response that was dated June 19th, I agree with everything that is set forth in that 
document." Tr., p. 81, L. 6-11. The district court made written findings in support of its 
decision to award fees by adopting and incorporating as part of its reasoned argument a portion 
of the written record of the court, namely, Clark's response dated June 19, as well as everything 
set forth therein. Id. 
In the case of Pinnacle Engineers v. Heron Brook, LLC, 139 Idaho 756, 86 P. 3d 470 
(2004), this Court explained that while the court must consider the relevant factors of I.R.C.P. 
54( e )(3) in awarding attorney fees, it is not necessary that the court reference the rule or the 
factors as long as the court did consider those factors, which can be shown in various ways. It 
explained: 
We have previously upheld awards of attorney fees where the record 
indicates that the trial court considered the relevant factors even though it 
did not make any reference to the rule when making the award. In Brinkman 
v. Aid Insurance Co., 115 Idaho 346, 766 P.2d 1227 (1988) [Overruled on other 
grounds, Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 142 Idaho 589 
(2005)], the trial court awarded attorney fees in an amount roughly equal to the 
contingent fee the prevailing party had contracted to pay his attorneys. When 
making that award, the trial court mentioned only that the attorney fee was 
contingent and did not make any reference to Rule 54( e )(3) or to the other factors 
listed in that rule. We upheld the award, however, "because the record 
establishes that several of the eleven factors were argued and briefed to the 
court and there is no basis to conclude the court failed to consider each of the 
factors." 115 Idaho at 351, 766 P.2d at 1232. We further added, "Here, the 
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profile of the record provides enough information to presume that the trial 
judge considered the other pertinent factors enumerated in the [rule]." Id. 
Id. at 474. (Emphasis added). 
While in this case the district court did not specifically discuss the requirements of 
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3), it confirmed that it had read all the briefs submitted by the parties, and that 
Clark's brief addressed all those requirements (R. Vol. III, pp. 476-483). The district court 
incorporated the Rule 54(e)(3) elements and analysis when it specifically noted that it "agreed 
with everything [Clark] submitted in [her] brief' (Tr., p. 81, L. 10-11). The district court also 
explained at length the reasons behind its award as is required by I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). The Court's 
award of sanctions under Rule 11 (a)( 1) is also an independent but legally sufficient basis for 
upholding the award as well. 
4. Contrary to Thornton's assertion, no fees were awarded by the district 
court for Thornton's frivolous filing of a motion for stay and for waiver of 
the supersedeas bond. 
As explained in the previous section, the only award of attorney fees in this case was the 
$41,530.17 contained in the Amended Judgment entered on June 30, 2014 (and also contained in 
the Second Amended Judgment entered on February 25, 2015). 
Thornton claims that "the district court awarded Clark's post-judgment attorney fees as a 
Rule 11 sanction against Thornton for filing his motion for stay and a for waiver of the 
supersedeas bond requirement." Appellant's Brief, p. 37. (Emphasis added). It is true that 
Thornton brought his motion for stay and for waiver of the supersedeas bond requirement, which 
motion was not well grounded in fact or warranted by existing law14. It is also true that the 
Barretts (who by that time had been substituted in the place of Clark) had to defend against 
Thornton's frivolous motion, and that the Barretts requested sanctions15• It is also true that the 
district court granted the Barretts' request for sanctions under Rule 1 l(a)(l) because the court 
14 See Document 4 to Respondents' Motion to Augment - Motion for Stay Pending Appeal and 
Waiver of Supersedeas filed September 24, 2014. 
15 See Document 6 to Respondents' Motion to Augment- Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Stay Pending Appeal and Waiver of Supersedeas Bond filed October 15, 2014. 
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found that Thornton's motion was "not well grounded in fact nor is it warranted by existing law 
or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law."16 
However, it is not true that an Order was ever entered wherein actual attorney fees were awarded 
to the Barretts in this matter. This is because the Respondents never sought the fee award. 
Thornton argues that this "Court should hold that it was an abuse of discretion to award 
Rule 11 sanctions against Thornton for pleading for a stay and for a waiver of the supersedeas 
bond requirements." Appellant's Brief, p. 39. Respondents Barrett disagree. Although no 
actual fees were awarded, such an award was warranted due to the Barretts having to defend 
against Thornton's frivolous motion. 
The Barretts had argued in their opposition to Thornton's motion17 that the rule under 
which Thornton brought his motion- I.A.R. I3(b)(l4)-did not apply to a stay of a money 
judgment. Thornton specifically requested in his motion that the district court (1) prevent 
collection efforts on the money judgment, and (2) waive the supersedeas bond or other security 
that the plaintiff would otherwise be required to post under I.A.R. 13(b}(15}18 . The Barretts 
argued and the district court agreed that because the Rule is clear, it is frivolous to ask for a stay 
on collection efforts pending appeal of a money judgment without posting a bond. In their 
opposition, the Barretts explained that: 
[Clark] spent well over $40,000.00 defending against plaintiffs frivolous lawsuit, 
obtaining a Judgment against plaintiff and his attorney in the amount of 
$41,530.17, and is now attempting to collect on that Judgment. To thwart 
defendant's effort, plaintiff, who is essentially able to litigate cost-free due to his 
wife's representation of him, continues to file frivolous documents with the Court 
in contravention of Rule 11. His (and her) frivolous motions should be denied, 
16 See Document 4 to Appellant's Motion to Augment -Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for 
Stay Pending Appeal and Waiver ofSupersedeas Bond entered November 13, 2014, p. 2. 
17 See Document 6 to Respondents 'Motion to Augment - Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Stay Pending Appeal and Waiver ofSupersedeas Bond filed October 15, 2014, pp. 2, 3, 6-7. 
18 See Document 4 to Respondents' Motion to Augment - Motion for Stay Pending Appeal and 
Waiver ofSupersedeas filed September 24, 2014, p. 1. 
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and both should be sanctioned for the expenses defendants have incurred in 
responding to the motions[19]. 
While the district court agreed ·with the Barretts' arguments and granted their request for 
fees20, it did not award actual fees because after the Barretts filed their memorandum of costs21 , 
Thornton filed an objection and thereafter the district court never held a hearing and never made 
an actual award of fees. A review of the Register of Actions of this case reveals that after 
Thornton filed his objection, no hearing was held regarding Barretts' request and that no order 
awarding fees was entered. R., Supplemental Clerk's Records, pp. 23-28. 
5. In Thornton's argument related to Clark's attorney fees request, he again 
attempts to mislead this Court with false and harassing statements with no 
support in reality on the record. 
Thornton argues that: 
In this case, opposing counsel did not limit his request for attorney fees to time 
expended defending against Thornton's quiet title to the easement. R. Vol. Ill p. 
485-495. Thornton was billed for time expended on Boyd-Davis' and her 
husband's criminal conduct resulting in his criminal conviction. R. Vol. Ill p. 
495, Ll. 1-4. 
Thornton places a footnote to indicate that "Boyd-Davis' ... husband's criminal 
conviction" was in Bonner County Case Nos. CR-2014-2981 and CR-2014-2984. Appellant's 
Brief, p. 3322 • 
Respondents Barretts assert that this is yet another example of Thornton's malicious and 
vexatious pattern of harassment. The statement that Boyd-Davis' husband was convicted of a 
crime is false, Thornton knows it is false, and the Idaho Court Repository demonstrates it is 
false. Thornton places this false statement against a person who is not even a party to this case 
19 See Document 6 to Respondents' Motion to Augment- Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion/or 
Stay Pending Appeal and Waiver of Supersedeas Bond filed October 15, 2014,, p. 7. 
20 See Document 4 to Appellant's Motion to Augment-Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for 
Stay Pending Appeal and Waiver of Supersedeas Bond entered November 13, 2014. 
21 See Document 8 to Respondents ' Motion to Augment - Defendants/Counterclaimants' 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees filed November 26, 2014. 
22 Intervenor repeats the same false statement in the Intervenor's Brief at p. 3. 
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for no other reason than to harass the Barretts and these non-parties. Boyd-Davis23 was a witness 
to the incident wherein Thornton and the Intervenor blocked Clark's access to the gate, and she 
submitted an affidavit in support of Clark's motion for summary judgment. R. Vol. I, pp. 144-
162. Thornton and the Intervenor now seek to disparage Boyd-Davis and her husband. 
E. The district court properly substituted the Barretts in the stead of Clark. 
Thornton claims that the district court erroneously substituted "Keith L. [sic] and Deanna 
Barrett"24 in the stead of Clark. Thornton argues that "Clark is not alleged to be incompetent, 
there had been no appointment of guardian or conservator, and the facts do not support a motion 
to substitute parties." Appellant's Brief, p. 36. He additionally asserts that: 
Id. 
Barretts do not stand in the shoes of Kari Clark as to Thornton's damages in the 
event the matter is remanded to the district court. Barretts have not assumed 
liability in the event Thornton prevails in his appeal and is found to be entitled to 
damages and/or attorney fees for Clark's litigation in the underlying action. 
Although Thornton correctly states the applicable rule, LR.C.P. 25(c), he misinterprets 
the rule and misapplies it to the facts. 
On July 23, 2014, Clark brought a motion in the district court to substitute parties. R. 
Vol. III, p. 466. On July 28, 2014, filed a Notice of Substitution of Kenneth J Barrett and 
Deanna L. Barrett in the Stead of Respondent Kari A. Clark with this Court pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule 7. R. Vol. III, pp. 601-604. Clark provided evidence to the Court that she had 
"transferred title to her real property that is the subject of the instant appeal and the underlying 
District Court action to [the Barretts]" and that she had "assigned to the Barretts all her legal and 
equitable right, title and interest to pursue and/or defend claims in [these matters.]" Id., p. 601. 
The district court entered an order wherein it granted Clark's motion on August 4, 2014, which 
23 Terri Boyd-Davis is the sister of Respondent Deanna Barrett and the niece of Clark and 
Pandrea. 
24 Respondents are Kenneth J. and Deanna L. Barrett- not Keith L. and Deanna Barrett as 
Appellant wrongly states. 
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order provided that the Barretts "as assignees of KARI A. CLARK'S interests to pursue and/or 
defend claims ... are hereby substituted/or all purposes in the stead of [Clark]." Id., pp. 614-615. 
(Emphasis added). This Court entered its Order Approving Substitution on August 22, 2014. R. 
Vol. III, pp. 624-625. 
I.R.C.P. 25(c) provides: 
In case of any transfer of interest, the action may be continued by or against the 
original party, unless the court upon motion directs the person to whom the 
interest is transferred to be substituted in the action or joined with the original 
party. Service of the motion shall be made as provided in subdivision (a) of this 
rule. 
Id. (Emphasis added). 
It is not necessary that Clark be "incompetent," as Thornton infers, in order to support a 
substitution of parties. In this case, Clark transferred her interest in her real property to the 
Barretts and additionally assigned her claims in this action to them. Additionally, Clark was not 
and will not be found liable to Thornton for any damages. Thus, the district court had discretion 
to allow the substitution, and it properly did so. 
F. The Appellant's and Intervenor's request for attorney fees and sanctions 
against Respondents on appeal should be denied. 
Thornton argues he is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal under LC. §12-121, 
claiming that it was somehow frivolous for Respondents Barretts to defend against the appeal. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 39. Thornton and the Intervenor also request that this Court sanctions 
Respondents for I.A.R. 11.2 violations, falsely claiming that the Barretts have deceived the 
Court. Appellant's Brief, pp. 39-41, Intervenor's Brief, pp. 6-8. As already explained in this 
brief, Thornton's accusations are baseless. The only parties guilty of attempting to mislead the 
Court are Val Thornton and John Thornton. Neither attorney fees under LC.§ 12-121 nor 
sanctions under I.A.R. 11.2 are warranted, and this Court should thereby deny Thornton's and 
the Intervenor's request. 
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G. The Respondents are entitled to attorneys' fees and costs on appeal. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rules 11.2(a), 40, and 41, 
Respondents Barretts are entitled to an award of their costs and attorneys' fees on appeal. 
In this case, Thornton and the Intervenor acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law 
when they filed their Complaint and asserted that Clark had no easement across Thornton's 
property. Three separate deeds that are a matter of public record reserved an easement across 
Thornton's property. Thornton and the Intervenor additionally acted without a reasonable basis 
in fact or law when they blocked Clark's easement access. 
As argued throughout this brief, Thornton and his wife/attorney, the Intervenor herein 
brought a frivolous case against Clark that was not well grounded in fact or warranted by law. 
Thornton and the Intervenor attempted to mislead the district by not producing a copy of the 
Thornton Deed and removing the specific easement language from what Thornton represented to 
the district court was the legal description of his property. On appeal, they have again attempted 
to mislead this Court by doctoring the record on appeal. Both the Appellant's Brief and the 
Intervenor's Brief are frivolous, misleading, and contain what are undeniably false statements of 
fact. 
An award of attorney fees under LC.§ 12-121 to the prevailing party is proper when the 
action was either brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Kelly v. 
Silverwood Estates, 127 Idaho 624, 903 P.2d 1321 (1995). 
Additionally, an award of sanctions is appropriate under I.A.R. 11.2( a), which provides: 
Every notice of appeal, petition, motion, brief and other document of a party 
represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one (1) licensed attorney of 
record of the state of Idaho, in the attorney's individual name, whose address shall 
be stated before the same may be filed. A party who is not represented by an 
attorney shall sign the notice of appeal, petition, motion, brief or other document 
and state the party's address. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a 
certificate that the attorney or party has read the notice of appeal, petition, 
motion, brief or other document; that to the best of the signer's knowledge 
information, and belief after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and 
is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or 
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needless increase in the cost of litigation. If the notice of appeal, petition, 
motion, brief, or other document is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon 
motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a 
represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to 
pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred 
because of the filing of the notice of appeal, petition, motion, brief or other 
document including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
Id. (Emphasis added). 
"[W]hether sanctions are appropriate turns on whether this appeal is interposed for any 
'improper purpose."' Painter v. Potlatch Corp., 138 Idaho 309, 63 P. 3d 435,441 (2003). In 
this case, Thornton and the Intervenor are continuing this lawsuit on appeal for an improper 
purpose, just as they did in the underlying action. In the case of Talbot v. Ames Const., 127 
Idaho 648, 940 P .2d 560 (1995), this Court sanctioned an attorney for acting in bad faith in 
bringing an appeal, stating: 
Under I.A.R. 11.1 this Court shall impose sanctions upon an attorney who signs a 
notice of appeal, petition, motion, or brief that is not well grounded in fact, 
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, 
modification or reversal of existing law, or is interposed for any improper 
purpose. I.A.R. 11.1. 
*** 
We agree ... that the attorney ... acted in bad faith in bringing this appeal. There 
was no good-faith argument by this attorney for an extension or modification of 
existing law. There was no basis in fact for this appeal. .. There were no legal 
arguments presented to this Court as a basis for an appeal of this case. [The 
attorney] had no basis for this appeal, wasted judicial resources, and acted in bad 
faith in pursuit of this appeal. We conclude that the imposition of personal 
sanctions against [ the attorney] pursuant to I.A.R. 11.1 are warranted. 
Id. at 565. 
Thornton and the Intervenor have acted in bad faith in bringing this appeal and have 
continued to waste judicial resources. For the reasons explained above, Respondents Barretts 
respectfully request that this Court impose sanctions on Thornton and the Intervenor, and award 
the Barretts their attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons stated above, Respondents Barretts respectfully request that this 
Court confirm the decision of the district court in this matter in all respects. Respondents 
Barretts additionally request that this Court award them their attorney fees and costs in defending 
against this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this "f day of January 2016. 
Michael G. Schmidt 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of January 2016 I caused to be served two 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document on the parties listed below in the manner 
indicated. 
Val Thornton 1)4 U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
4685 Upper Pack River Road [ ] Hand Delivered 
Sandpoint, ID 83 864 [ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile: 208-255-2327 
Mary Pandrea lXl U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
4687 Upper Pack River Road [ ] Hand Delivered 
Sandpoint, ID 83 864 [ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile: 
Michael G. Schmidt 
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